关税、数据安全和全球合作:驾驭电动汽车市场的地缘政治因素

长期以来,关税一直被用作经济战的工具和削弱竞争对手出口优势的手段。最近,美国和欧盟对中国电动汽车征收高额关税,成为备受全球关注的贸...
来源:《澳华财经在线》 编辑:Cathy 作者:张越(Marina Yue Zhang) 2024-07-28 13:59:08 A+

 作者: 张越(Marina Yue Zhang)

(英文原文2024年6月25日首发于The Interpreter)

11.jpg

(本文作者张越(Marina Zhang)博士是悉尼科技大学澳中关系研究院 (UTS:ACRI)的副教授)

更多作者介绍请点击

【本文核心观点】

● 保护主义无助于全球气候目标的实现  

● 对数据安全的担忧将对中国电动汽车行业产生比关税更为深远的影响

长期以来,关税一直被用作经济战的工具和削弱竞争对手出口优势的手段。

最近,美国和欧盟对中国电动汽车征收高额关税,成为备受全球关注的贸易争端焦点。

美国总统乔·拜登政府对中国电动汽车的进口关税已提高四倍达到最新的100%,以此回应所谓的中国电动车“低价出口“和“不公平贸易行为”。考虑到中国品牌电动车在美国的市场份额很小,增加关税带来的直接后果微乎其微,中方认为这些关税是惩罚性的。

欧盟也宣布对中国电动汽车征收高达 38% 的额外关税的计划,此举被视为保护欧洲汽车制造商免受“不公平竞争”的必要举措。因那些与中国市场联系密切的欧洲车企担心关税上调可能会引发报复,欧盟最近表示同意就关税计划和中方进行磋商。

上述表明,抑制全球经济合作的贸易保护主义倾向,在中国电动汽车行业异军突起并主宰电动汽车供应链的背景下日益增强,同时亦反映出一种忧虑——来自强大电动汽车产能中国的低成本汽车,可能会流向全球进而将市场扭曲。

这种逻辑前提可能存在缺陷。

在经济学家看来,产能过剩意味着实际产能与潜在产能之间的缺口,这通常会因由内需不足造成。在全球市场上,过剩产能通常可以通过出口以满足其它地区和市场的有效需求。如果这种出口基于政府补贴,则被视为倾销过剩产能。

然而,中国的电动汽车行业并不完全符合这种情况。

从产业政策角度看,中国电动汽车行业的发展确实得益于政策支持和财政补贴。我最近的一项研究,分析了 2006 至 2023 年期间中国政府颁布的与电动汽车行业发展相关的 153 项产业政策,结果发现其中与财政补贴直接相关的政策仅有24项,其余131项政策,则主要集中在行业标准、生产许可、低碳目标、安全法规、充电设施和其他基础设施建设以及扩大农村市场上。

研究结果表明,中国电动汽车补贴,主要用于支持研发和绿色创新。事实上,这些举措可令国内外汽车制造商均从中受益。

中国政府对需求侧的补贴,旨在激励消费者购买使用电动汽车——补贴通常通过汽车制造商、经销商或车辆注册部门等渠道发放。而电网和充电基础设施方面的补贴,则在更广泛的范围内增强了电动汽车产业链的生态系统建设。

这些补贴计划,符合世贸组织规则,亦驳斥了中国倾销补贴商品的指控。

对于中国而言,贸易争端无疑对其成为汽车行业全球参与者的雄心,构成了重大挑战。

然而,鉴于中国国内对电动汽车的巨大需求,以及支撑中国在全球电动汽车供应链中主导地位的无与伦比的成本优势——不仅包括电池,还包括电机、驱动和控制系统,以及上游的镍、锂和钴等关键电池金属材料的加工,额外的关税不会对中国电动汽车产业发展造成实质性影响。

然而,随着其他国家也在采取保护主义政策,贸易争端呈现的只是保护主义带来的潜在风险的一面。

电动汽车带来的产业革命,远远不只是汽车从内燃机驱动到电池驱动的转变——从本质上讲,这种转变是关于数字化和连通性的。

现代电动汽车与数字技术深度融合,有关车辆性能、驾驶员行为、车辆位置、行驶模式,以及与其他车辆和环境互动的大量数据被收集、处理和传输——这对于优化效率、增强用户体验以及开发新的服务(如V2X(车对万物)系统和自动驾驶)至关重要。此外,基于数字化数据之上的服务——车辆维护预测和和汽车备件库存优化,亦将因此得以实现。

基于这些服务需求的数据收集,存在被滥用的可能进而对国家安全构成潜在威胁。因此,电动汽车或成为地缘政治博弈中浮现的另一个中心——不仅涉及拥有成熟汽车工业的国家,还涉及纯粹的电动汽车进口国。

相较于关税,对数据安全的担忧对中国电动汽车行业产生的影响可能更为深远。例如,随着越来越多的电动汽车进入澳大利亚,中国电动汽车制造商及其代理销售商,将不得不在汽车零部件库存和售后服务设施方面进行投资——而后者则必需基于数据驱动。在监管层面,外国投资审查委员会(FIRB)需要在这些和中国电动汽车相关的投资带来的好处利益以及安全担忧之间权衡利弊,特别是在数据安全和对经济影响方面。

西方国家有理由对电动汽车的数据主权和安全保持警惕,然而对数据实施限制并非最佳解决方案,因为它可能会导致技术脱钩和供应链脱节。虽然限制数据可能会提供短期安全,但更会扼杀科技创新,进而阻滞自动驾驶和智能电网间整合前行的步伐,最终使得全球距离更清洁、更互联、更高效的交通生态系统愈来愈远。

作为一个国内汽车工业规模较小的国家,澳大利亚应通过倡导开放合作,在发展多边机构方面保持中立立场。相较于诉诸保护主义措施和追求数据主权,更有效的战略应该包括为数据收集、数据本地化和隐私保护制定明确的规则和国际标准;明确国家和个人对其数据的权利,并确保涉及用户隐私的数据在跨境安全使用中得到有力保障。这种方法,不仅解决数据安全问题,推动技术创新,同时维系了电动汽车行业发展中全球合作创造的价值。

对于澳大利亚来说,新兴的电动汽车地缘政治格局,为其提供了一个展示示范和带头作用的窗口,一个通过优先考虑可持续性、经济增长和全球合作在世界范围内树立榜样的机会。

通过这种方式,澳大利亚不仅可以为未来一个联系更紧密、更清洁和更繁荣的世界做出贡献,同时亦可在被保护主义色彩所笼罩的美国、欧洲和中国之间的竞争中,处于超然的独立地位。

本文作者张越博士是悉尼科技大学澳中关系研究院 (UTS: ACRI)副教授。在加入 UTS 之前曾在新南威尔士大学 (UNSW) 和清华大学任职。张越拥有北京大学生命科学学士学位以及澳大利亚国立大学工商管理硕士学位和创新学博士学位。

张越博士学术研究方向为技术经济及创新,已出版发行著作多部,其中包括与马克·道奇森和大卫·甘恩合著的《混沌秩序:揭秘中国创新机器》(Demystifying China's Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order, co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann )(牛津大学出版社,2022 年)。

除了在技术和创新领域的研究和学术出版,张越最新学术研究扩展至地缘政治对技术创新的影响,包括半导体、关键矿产、智能制造、清洁能源转型和中国数字经济等技术在地缘政治中的角色与影响,撰写发表了技术与地缘政治交叉领域的深度分析文章。

她的评论和分析经常刊登在《国家利益》、《外交家》、《洛伊-解读》、《澳大利亚展望》、《东亚论坛》、《珍珠与刺激》、《对话》等媒体上。路透社、BBC、CNN、金融时报、Wires China、CNBC、《自然》、《纽约时报》、《华盛顿邮报》、《澳大利亚金融评论报》、ABC 澳广和 CNA 等新闻媒体都曾先后采访过她或引用过她的研究成果或作品。

附:英文版原文及链接:

TARIFFS, DATA SECURITY AND GLOBAL COLLABORATION: NAVIGATING THE GEOPOLITICS OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES

JUNE 25 2024 By Marina Yue Zhang

Tariffs have long been wielded as a tool of economic warfare, a means to undercut the advantages of rivals’ exports. The spotlight of global trade disputes has most recently swung to pledges by the United States and the European Union to impose steep tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs).

US President Joe Biden has increased tariffs on China’s EVs fourfold, bringing them to 100 percent, in response to what are considered ‘unfair trade practices’ by China and ‘artificially low-priced’ exports. These tariffs are viewed as punitive by the Chinese side, although the direct consequences are thought to be minimal, as Chinese brands have very little market share in the United States.

The European Union has also announced plans to impose up to 38 percent additional tariffs on Chinese EVs, a move seen as necessary to shield European automakers from ‘unfair competition’. The EU’s approach is more gentle, as those automakers with deep ties to the Chinese market are concerned that the rising tariffs may spark retaliation. The bloc has also agreed in recent days to negotiate about the tariff plan.

What these actions reflect is a growing trend of protectionism over economic collaboration in response to China’s rise in the EV sector and its dominance in the EV supply chain. The concern is that China may flood global markets with low-cost vehicles due to its overcapacity in EV production, thereby distorting the global market.

This premise might be flawed. Economists argue that overcapacity indicates a gap between actual and potential capacity, often due to insufficient domestic demand. In a global market, excess capacity can be exported to meet effective demand elsewhere. If government subsidies facilitate this type of export, it constitutes dumping excess capacity.

China’s EV case, however, does not fit this scenario neatly.

From an industrial policy perspective, the development of China’s EV sector has indeed benefited from policy support and financial subsidies. My research analysed 153 industrial policies by China’s central government related to EV development from 2006 to 2023 and found that only 24 policies were directly related to financial subsidies. The rest focused on industrial standards, production licensing, low-carbon goals, safety regulations, building charging facilities and other infrastructure, and expanding rural markets. China’s EV subsidies mainly support R&D and green innovations, benefiting both domestic and foreign automakers. Demand-side subsidies, often channelled through automakers, dealers, or registration, incentivise consumers to adopt EVs, while grid and charging infrastructure subsidies enhance the broader EV ecosystem. These subsidy schemes comply with WTO rules, countering accusations of dumping subsidised goods.

For China, trade disputes undoubtedly pose a significant challenge to its ambitions of becoming a global player in the automobile industry. However, given China’s massive domestic demand for EVs and its unmatched cost advantages derived from its control over EV supply chains – comprising not only batteries but also electric motors, drives, and control systems, as well as upstream processing of critical battery metals such as nickel, lithium, and cobalt – the extra tariffs will not cause a substantial impact on Chinese EV development.

But as other nations also adopt protectionist policies, trade disputes are only one aspect of the risk involved.

The EV revolution also extends far beyond the shift from internal combustion engines to battery-powered propulsion. At its core, this transformation is about digitalisation and connectivity. Modern EVs are deeply integrated with digital technologies, collecting, processing, and transmitting extensive data on vehicle performance, driver behaviour, location, travel patterns, and interactions with other vehicles and environments. This data is crucial for optimising efficiency, enhancing user experience, and developing new services such as V2X (Vehicle-to-Everything) systems and autonomous driving. Additionally, digitalisation enables data-driven services such as predictive maintenance and optimised inventory of spare parts.

Data collected through these services could be misused, thus posing a national security threat. For this reason, EVs are emerging as another epicentre in the geopolitical competition, involving not only nations with established automobile industries but also those that are purely EV importers.

The concerns about data security will have a much more profound impact on China’s EV industry than tariffs. For example, with an increasing number of EVs coming to Australia, Chinese EV makers and their supply chains will need to invest in data-driven spare parts and services facilities. Regulating these Chinese EV investments requires the Foreign Investment Review Board to weigh benefits against security concerns, particularly regarding data security and economic impact.

Western countries have legitimate cause to be wary of data sovereignty and security in EVs. However, implementing sanctions on data is not an optimal solution, as it will likely lead to technology decoupling and supply chain segregation. While this may offer short-term security, it could stifle innovation, thereby delaying advancements in autonomous driving and smart grid integration and push the world away from a cleaner and more connected and efficient transportation ecosystem.

As a country with little domestic automobile industry, Australia should maintain a neutral position in developing multilateral institutions by advocating for open collaboration. Instead of resorting to protectionist measures and pursuing data sovereignty, a more effective strategy would include establishing clear rules and international standards for data collection, data localisation, and privacy protections; defining the rights of nations and individuals over their data; and ensuring robust safeguards for user privacy across borders. Such an approach would address security concerns while fostering innovation and maintaining the benefits of global cooperation in EV development.

For Australia, the emerging EV geopolitical terrain presents an opportunity to lead by example by prioritising sustainability, economic growth, and global cooperation. By taking this approach, Australia can contribute to a cleaner, more connected, and prosperous world while maintaining an independent approach to the protectionist contest between the United States, Europe and China.

阅读英文版请点击链接:

About the author: 

11.jpg

Dr. Marina Yue Zhang is an Associate Professor at the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney (UTS: ACRI). Before joining UTS, she held positions at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and Tsinghua University. Marina holds a bachelor’s degree in biological sciences from China’s Peking University, and an MBA and a PhD in innovation studies from the Australian National University. Dr. Zhang is the author of three books, including Demystifying China's Innovation Machine: Chaotic Order, co-authored with Mark Dodgson and David Gann (Oxford University Press, 2022). In addition to her academic publications in technology and innovation, she also writes analytical pieces on the intersection of technology and geopolitics, delving into industries such as semiconductors, critical minerals, smart manufacturing, clean energy transition, and digital economy in China. Her commentaries and analyses regularly feature in The National Interest, The Diplomat, Lowy The Interpreter, Australian Outlook, East Asia Forum, Pearls and Irritations, The Conversation, among others. News outlets such as Reuters, BBC, CNN, Financial Times, Wires, CNBC, Nature, New York Times, Washington Post, Australian Financial Review, ABC, and CNA have interviewed her or cited her works.

【小编贴士:】手机端阅读时,点击文章页面左上Logo即可返回首页阅读。祝读者朋友天天健康、开心!工作投资顺利。

免责声明:市场有风险投资需谨慎!本网所发所有文章,包括本网原创、编译及转发的第三方稿件及评论,均不构成任何投资建议,交易操作或投资决定请询问专业人士。

(郑重声明:ACB News《澳华财经在线》对标注为原创的文章保留全部著作权限。澳大利亚境内任何媒体、企业网站或App的任何形式转载前,必须获得本网授权或经相关安排,转载事宜请邮件联系本网。未经本网授权或书面同意的转载——无论直接转载或通过第三方转载,均视为侵权!侵权必究!转载时须标注文字及图片出处。)

分享 评论 (0)
推荐阅读

分享到